| Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action Contributor(s): Bishop, John (Author) |
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ISBN: 0521374308 ISBN-13: 9780521374309 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $125.40 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: January 1990 Annotation: From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | Movements - Humanism - Philosophy | Ethics & Moral Philosophy |
| Dewey: 128.4 |
| LCCN: 89033231 |
| Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy |
| Physical Information: 0.63" H x 5.5" W x 8.5" (0.95 lbs) 224 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that free will is impossible under scientific determinism. This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature. |