| Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment Revised 2003 Edition Contributor(s): Desch, Michael C. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0801866391 ISBN-13: 9780801866395 Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press OUR PRICE: $28.50 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: March 2001 Annotation: The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. But as Michael Desch argues in this thought-provoking challenge to Harold Lasswell's famous "garrison state" thesis, the truth is that civilian authorities have not been able to exert greater control over military policies and decision making. In wartime, civil authorities cannot help but pay close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, civilian leaders are less interested in military affairs--and therefore often surrender them to the military. Focusing on a wide range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in U.S. civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and France's role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in South America. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | Security (national & International) - Political Science | American Government - General - History | Military - General |
| Dewey: 355.02 |
| LCCN: 2007031884 |
| Physical Information: 0.55" H x 6.02" W x 9" (0.60 lbs) 200 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. But as Michael Desch argues in this thought-provoking challenge to Harold Lasswell's famous "garrison state" thesis, the truth is that civilian authorities have not been able to exert greater control over military policies and decision making. In wartime, civil authorities cannot help but pay close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, civilian leaders are less interested in military affairs--and therefore often surrender them to the military. Focusing on a wide range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in U.S. civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and France's role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in South America. |
Contributor Bio(s): Desch, Michael C.: - Michael C. Desch is a professor and the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making at the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is the editor-in-chief of Security Studies and the author of Civilian Control of the Military, also published by Johns Hopkins. |