| Federal Tort Claims Act: Volume 2 Contributor(s): Publications, Landmark (Author) |
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ISBN: ISBN-13: 9798665086309 Publisher: Independently Published OUR PRICE: $41.04 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: July 2020 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Law | Personal Injury - Law | Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice |
| Physical Information: 1.1" H x 6" W x 9" (1.58 lbs) 544 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * Enacted in 1946, the FTCA provides that the United States shall be liable, to the same extent as a private party, "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. 2674 ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ..."). In doing so, the FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity for tort claims against the federal government in cases where a private individual would have been liable under "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1).That waiver, however, is limited to only "permit ] certain types of actions against the United States." Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1975). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. 2680 "provides for several exceptions that 'severely limit ]' the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity." Snyder, 859 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Morris, 521 F.2d at 874). If a plaintiff's tort claim falls within one of the exceptions, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. To determine whether section 2680 bars a proposed claim, we "look ] beyond the labels," Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988), and evaluate the alleged "conduct on which the claim is based," Mt. Homes, Inc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1990). For instance, in Thomas-Lazear, we noted that "the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is nothing more than a restatement of the originally barred] slander claim" because "the Government's actions that constitute a claim for slander are essential to the plaintiff]'s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress." 851 F.2d at 1207. Hence, it was also barred by section 2680(h) as " t]here is no other government conduct upon which the claim] can rest." Id. (quoting Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986)); see also Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that negligence claim was actually one of misrepresentation); Leaf v. United States, 661 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). Thus, if the governmental conduct underlying a claim falls within an exception outlined in section 2680, the claim is barred, no matter how the tort is characterized. See Mt. Homes, 912 F.2d at 356. DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. US, 926 F. 3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2019) |