| Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia Contributor(s): Joeck, Neil (Author) |
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ISBN: 0198294069 ISBN-13: 9780198294061 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA OUR PRICE: $37.95 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: March 1998 Annotation: This book argues that, while nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast a shadow over Indo-Pakistani relations, they do not create strategic stability. He asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability, but that diplomatic steps focused on missiles must also be considered. Improved command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that nuclear weapons are not used in any future conflict. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | International Relations - Arms Control - Political Science | Security (national & International) - History | Asia - India & South Asia |
| Dewey: 355.021 |
| LCCN: 98077508 |
| Series: International Institute for Strategic Studies |
| Physical Information: 0.19" H x 6.14" W x 9.21" (0.31 lbs) 90 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Indo-Pakistani relations are shadowed by the issue of nuclear weapons and the specter that nuclear-capable missiles may soon be deployed. In this book, author Neil Joeck argues that basic nuclear capabilities have in fact not created strategic stability. Such capabilities, he argues, neither explain the absence of war over the past decade nor why war is currently unlikely. While limited nuclear capabilities increase the costs of conflict, they do little to reduce the risk of its occurrence. Maintaining Nuclear Stability asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability in a crisis and improve India's and Pakistan's ability to avoid nuclear use if war breaks out, and that diplomatic steps particularly focused on missiles must also be considered. With nuclear weapons in hand, the price of potential failed deterrence is catastrophically high. Investing more resources on a bet that nuclear capabilities ensure safety only raises the penalties if the initial decision was wrong. Joeck proposes that command and control and diplomatic engagement provide some insurance that, if that bet is called, nuclear use is not the only choice left. |