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Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails
Contributor(s): Mahoney, Paul G. (Author)
ISBN: 022642099X     ISBN-13: 9780226420998
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
OUR PRICE:   $28.71  
Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats
Published: November 2016
Qty:
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Law | Securities
- Law | Legal History
- Law | Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice
Dewey: 346.73
Physical Information: 0.46" H x 6" W x 9" (0.65 lbs) 208 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
The recent financial crisis led to sweeping reforms that inspired countless references to the financial reforms of the New Deal. Comparable to the reforms of the New Deal in both scope and scale, the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank Act of 2010--the main regulatory reform package introduced in the United States--also shared with New Deal reforms the assumption that the underlying cause of the crisis was misbehavior by securities market participants, exacerbated by lax regulatory oversight.

With Wasting a Crisis, Paul G. Mahoney offers persuasive research to show that this now almost universally accepted narrative of market failure--broadly similar across financial crises--is formulated by political actors hoping to deflect blame from prior policy errors. Drawing on a cache of data, from congressional investigations, litigation, regulatory reports, and filings to stock quotes from the 1920s and '30s, Mahoney moves beyond the received wisdom about the financial reforms of the New Deal, showing that lax regulation was not a substantial cause of the financial problems of the Great Depression. As new regulations were formed around this narrative of market failure, not only were the majority largely ineffective, they were also often counterproductive, consolidating market share in the hands of leading financial firms. An overview of twenty-first-century securities reforms from the same analytic perspective, including Dodd-Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, shows a similar pattern and suggests that they too may offer little benefit to investors and some measurable harm.


Contributor Bio(s): Mahoney, Paul G.: - Paul G. Mahoney is a David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.