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Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory 2006 Edition
Contributor(s): Feldman, Allan M. (Author), Serrano, Roberto (Author)
ISBN: 0387293671     ISBN-13: 9780387293677
Publisher: Springer
OUR PRICE:   $189.99  
Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats
Published: December 2005
Qty:
Annotation: Welfare economics, and social choice theory, are disciplines that blend economics, ethics, political science, and mathematics.

Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd Edition, include models of economic exchange and production, uncertainty, optimality, public goods, social improvement criteria, life and death choices, majority voting, Arrow??'s theorem, and theories of implementation and mechanism design.
Our goal is to make value judgments about economic and political mechanisms: For instance, does the competitive market produce distributions of products and services that are good or bad for society? Does majority voting produce good or bad outcomes? How can we design tax mechanisms that result in efficient amounts of public goods being produced?

We have attempted, in this book, to minimize mathematical obstacles, and to make this field accessible to undergraduate and graduate students and the interested non-expert.
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Business & Economics | Economics - Microeconomics
- Business & Economics | Economics - Theory
- Business & Economics | Econometrics
Dewey: 330.155
LCCN: 2005935332
Physical Information: 1.2" H x 6.4" W x 9.2" (1.65 lbs) 404 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics -- general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un- certainty, externalities and public goods -- and some of the major topics of social choice theory -- compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex- cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.