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Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
Contributor(s): Roth, Alvin E. (Editor), Roth, Alvin E. (Other)
ISBN: 0521267579     ISBN-13: 9780521267571
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
OUR PRICE:   $133.00  
Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats
Published: November 1985
Qty:
Annotation: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the ???pure bargaining problem??? is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of ???perfect competition???. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Business & Economics | Economic History
- Social Science
- Business & Economics | Economics - Theory
Dewey: 302.307
LCCN: 84028516
Physical Information: 1.06" H x 6" W x 9" (1.68 lbs) 404 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.