| Judging in Good Faith Contributor(s): Burton, Steven J. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0521419948 ISBN-13: 9780521419949 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $90.25 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: August 1992 Annotation: This book is concerned with the ethics of judging in courts of law. Professor Burton analyzes the grounds, content, and force of a judge's legal and moral duties to uphold the law. He defends two primary theses. The first is the good faith thesis, whereby judges are bound in law to uphold the law, even when they have discretion, by acting only on reasons warranted by the conventional law as grounds for judical decisions. The good faith thesis counters the common view that judges are not bound by the law when they exercise discretion. The second is the permissible discretion thesis, whereby, when exercised in good faith, judicial discretion is compatible with the legitimacy of adjudication in a constitutional democracy under the Rule of Law. The permissible discretion thesis counters the view that judges can fulfill their duty to uphold the law only when the law yields determinate results. Together, these two theses provide an original and powerful theory of adjudication in sharp contrast both to conservative theories that would restrict the scope of adjudication unduly, and to leftist critical theories that would liberate judges from the Rule of Law. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Law | Natural Law - Philosophy | Political |
| Dewey: 340.112 |
| LCCN: 91047159 |
| Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy & Law |
| Physical Information: 1.2" H x 6.3" W x 9.35" (1.21 lbs) 292 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book offers an original theory of adjudication focused on the ethics of judging in courts of law. It offers two main theses. The good faith thesis defends the possibility of lawful judicial decisions even when judges have discretion. The permissible discretion thesis defends the compatibility of judicial discretion and legal indeterminacy with the legitimacy of adjudication in a constitutional democracy. Together, these two theses oppose both conservative theories that would restrict the scope of adjudication unduly and leftist critical theories that would liberate judges from the rule of law. |