| Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy Contributor(s): Alesina, Alberto (Author), Rosenthal, Howard (Author) |
|
 |
ISBN: 0521436206 ISBN-13: 9780521436205 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $39.89 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: January 1995 Annotation: This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarized preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors first outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recession, and Democratic administrations with expansions, and next the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the mid-term congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage. A final chapter shows how the analysis sheds light on the economies and political processes of other industrial democracies. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Economics - Microeconomics - Political Science | American Government - General |
| Dewey: 338.542 |
| LCCN: 93048512 |
| Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| Physical Information: 0.67" H x 6" W x 8.98" (0.98 lbs) 300 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book explores how the political process in the United States influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results. It explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy and how the American voters achieve moderation by balancing the two institutions. Fluctuations in economic growth are shown to depend on the results of elections and, conversely, electoral results to depend on the state of the economy. The final chapter of the book establishes striking similarities between the American political economy and other industrial democracies. |