| Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence Contributor(s): Federal Trade Commission (Author) |
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ISBN: 1502738953 ISBN-13: 9781502738950 Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform OUR PRICE: $12.30 Product Type: Paperback Published: October 2014 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Science |
| Physical Information: 0.07" H x 8.5" W x 11.02" (0.22 lbs) 32 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indeterminate. We design an experiment to compare individuals' decisions across three contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, but are typically not isomorphic under other risk preferences. The pattern of individual play across our contests is not consistent with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any distribution of risk preferences. We show that replacing the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept with the quintal response equilibrium, along with heterogeneous risk preferences can produce equilibrium patterns of play that are very similar to the patterns we observe. |