| The Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II Contributor(s): Usmc Command and Staff College (Author) |
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ISBN: 1508714347 ISBN-13: 9781508714347 Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform OUR PRICE: $12.30 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: March 2015 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - History | Military - World War Ii |
| Physical Information: 0.08" H x 8.5" W x 11.02" (0.26 lbs) 40 pages |
| Themes: - Chronological Period - 1940's |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkage between tactics and strategy, and its application as operational art. The Red Army's development of deep battle during the interwar years and its refinement during World War II is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union's military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a heoretical level, to a political controlled strategic doctrine, emerged as an offensive biased operational mindset, and, if Finland is overlooked, resulted in World War II deep battle success. The Red Army achieved victory in both Finnish campaigns through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland's systematic withdrawal prevented the destruction of its army - the key Soviet operationalobjective. Within five years the Soviet Union defeated Finland in two wars, but failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle and by its own definition operational art. A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and herrealization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals. This experience questions the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights the primacy of competent strategic planning. |