| Washington's War: A Study in Operational Design Contributor(s): Penny Hill Press (Editor), Usmc Command and Staff College (Author) |
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ISBN: 1535289171 ISBN-13: 9781535289177 Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform OUR PRICE: $12.30 Product Type: Paperback Published: July 2016 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - History | United States - Revolutionary Period (1775-1800) |
| Physical Information: 0.07" H x 8.5" W x 11.02" (0.23 lbs) 34 pages |
| Themes: - Chronological Period - 18th Century |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: When one thinks of great American military strategists and applicators of operational art, names other than George Washington usually float to the top of our minds because of his allegedly mediocre tactical results. Washington's body of work is typically studied through the lens of organization, inspiration, and resilience. Many military scholars often criticize his work as a military strategist, while other military intellectuals, including cadre at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, label Washington as a great insurgent leader, insinuating his aversion to a decisive battle and lack of large offensive campaigns make him an insurgent leader. However, from 1775 to 1781, George Washington designed a legitimate plan to defeat the greatest military power on earth, and his success was not by accident or by avoiding engagements. George Washington capitalized on British mistakes and incorporated a coherent design approach that ultimately resulted in the desired military endstate for the young American nation by successfully utilizing objectives, military endstate, centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, direct and indirect approaches, area of influence, and operational reach. |