| Fuzzy Rationality: A Critique and Methodological Unity of Classical, Bounded and Other Rationalities 2009 Edition Contributor(s): Dompere, Kofi Kissi (Author) |
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ISBN: 3540880828 ISBN-13: 9783540880820 Publisher: Springer OUR PRICE: $208.99 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: March 2009 Annotation: This monograph is special in its orientation. It is first of its kind devoted to bringing to the general scientific community, the epistemic foundation of fuzzy paradigm composed of its logic and mathematics of reasoning. It is first of a sequence of treaties on fuzzy decision-choice rationality. The monograph presents the structure of general rationality and points of entry of classical, bounded and related rationalities. Fuzzy decision-choice rationality is then introduced as a critique and methodological unity of classical and bounded rationalities. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | Logic - Computers | Intelligence (ai) & Semantics - Mathematics | Applied |
| Dewey: 511.322 |
| Series: Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing |
| Physical Information: 0.75" H x 6.14" W x 9.21" (1.34 lbs) 283 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Philosophy involves a criticism of scientific knowledge, not from a point of view ultimately different from that of science, but from a point of view less concerned with details and more concerned with the h- mony of the body of special sciences. Here as elsewhere, while the older logic shut out possibilities and imprisoned imagination within the walls of the familiar, the newer logic shows rather what may happen, and refuses to decide as to what must happen. Bertrand Russell At any particular stage in the development of humanity knowledge comes up against limits set by the necessarily limited character of the experience available and the existing means of obtaining knowledge. But humanity advances by overcoming such limits. New experience throws down the limits of old experience; new techniques, new means of obtaining knowledge throw down the limits of old techniques and old means of obtaining knowledge. New limits then once again appear. But there is no more reason to suppose these new limits absolute and final than there was to suppose the old ones absolute and final. |