| Managing Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War Contributor(s): Hone, Thomas C. (Author), Mandeles, Mark D. (Author), Terry, Sanford S. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0275952614 ISBN-13: 9780275952617 Publisher: Praeger OUR PRICE: $94.05 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: October 1996 Annotation: During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - History | Middle East - General - History | Military - Strategy - History | Military - Persian Gulf War (1991) |
| Dewey: 956.704 |
| LCCN: 95046157 |
| Lexile Measure: 1540 |
| Series: Contributions in Women's Studies; 156 |
| Physical Information: 0.76" H x 6.18" W x 9.3" (0.90 lbs) 192 pages |
| Themes: - Cultural Region - Middle East |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed. |