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Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown
Contributor(s): Carpenter, Stanley D. (Author)
ISBN: 080616185X     ISBN-13: 9780806161853
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
OUR PRICE:   $34.60  
Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats
Published: March 2019
Qty:
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- History | United States - Revolutionary Period (1775-1800)
- History | Europe - Great Britain - Georgian Era (1714-1837)
- History | Military - Strategy
Dewey: 973.337
LCCN: 2018027374
Series: Campaigns and Commanders
Physical Information: 1.1" H x 8.6" W x 9.3" (1.30 lbs) 332 pages
Themes:
- Chronological Period - 18th Century
- Cultural Region - British Isles
- Cultural Region - South
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:

In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778-81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War--and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire.

Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis's operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists' support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command.

Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter's analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.


Contributor Bio(s): Carpenter, Stanley D. M.: - Stanley D. M. Carpenter is Professor of Strategy and Policy and Naval War College Command Historian at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He is the author of Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: "The Genius of This Age" and the editor of The English Civil War.