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The Strategic Management of High Technology Contracts: Competence Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives
Contributor(s): Nordberg, Markus (Author), Verbeke, Alain (Author), Thomas, Howard (Editor)
ISBN: 0080435750     ISBN-13: 9780080435756
Publisher: Elsevier Science Ltd
OUR PRICE:   $154.84  
Product Type: Hardcover
Published: December 1999
Qty:
Annotation: High technology research laboratories are under constant pressure from the governments that support them to generate secondary utilities such as technology transfer and spin-offs. As buyers, such organisations are often used by governments to stimulate innovation by their suppliers, under tight budgetary constraints and within the rigid institutional frameworks applied to public research organisations. This book addresses the design of efficient buyer-supplier contracts within the institutional boundaries faced by the buyer and focuses in particular on vertical buyer-supplier linkages as a source of supplier core competencies in a cost- and technology-driven environment.
Based on a study of manufacturing contracts commissioned by the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN), the book aims to answer two questions. First, what is the most efficient governance structure for organising buyer-supplier relationships, given the presence of specific institutional boundaries, high technological complexity and environmental uncertainty? Secondly, irrespective of the presence of such an efficient governance structure, what type of impact could technology-oriented government contracts have on supplier core competencies?
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Business & Economics | Industrial Management
- Technology & Engineering
- Business & Economics | Entrepreneurship
Dewey: 607.2
LCCN: 99029392
Series: Technology, Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Competitive Strategy
Physical Information: 0.56" H x 7" W x 10.24" (1.34 lbs) 214 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
High technology research laboratories are under constant pressure from the governments that support them to generate secondary utilities such as technology transfer and spin-offs. As buyers, such organisations are often used by governments to stimulate innovation by their suppliers, under tight budgetary constraints and within the rigid institutional frameworks applied to public research organisations. This book addresses the design of efficient buyer-supplier contracts within the institutional boundaries faced by the buyer and focuses in particular on vertical buyer-supplier linkages as a source of supplier core competencies in a cost- and technology-driven environment. Based on a study of manufacturing contracts commissioned by the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN), the book aims to answer two questions. First, what is the most efficient governance structure for organising buyer-supplier relationships, given the presence of specific institutional boundaries, high technological complexity and environmental uncertainty? Secondly, irrespective of the presence of such an efficient governance structure, what type of impact could technology-oriented government contracts have on supplier core competencies?