| Bilateral Bargaining: Theory and Applications 2002 Edition Contributor(s): Napel, Stefan (Author) |
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ISBN: 354043335X ISBN-13: 9783540433354 Publisher: Springer OUR PRICE: $94.99 Product Type: Paperback Published: April 2002 Annotation: The book investigates bargaining between two agents. It presents the history of bargaining analysis from Francis Y. Edgeworth's first formal study, followed by cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models, to recent stochastic evolutionary investigations. Connections between the results obtained by different methodology are highlighted. The established theory is generalized with respect to its underlying rationality assumptions. Links between usually neglected psychological factors - e.g. the persistence and capriciousness of an agent - and average bargaining success are identified. Applications of bargaining models contribute to the measurement of decision power and to the discussion of distributive justice. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Economics - Microeconomics - Mathematics | Game Theory - Political Science |
| Dewey: 519.3 |
| LCCN: 2002017905 |
| Series: Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems |
| Physical Information: 0.6" H x 6.34" W x 9.4" (0.72 lbs) 188 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma- tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu- lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques- tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non- permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma- nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc. |